Author: UH Press

ARTICLES

The Existential Moment: Rereading Dōgen’s Theory of Time
Rein Raud, 153

This article argues for a new way to interpret Dōgen’s theory of time, reading the notion of uji as momentary existence, and shows that many notorious difficulties usually associated with the theory can be overcome with this approach, which is also more compatible with some fundamental assumptions of Buddhist philosophy (the non-durational existence of dharmas, the arbitrariness of linguistic designations and the concepts they point to, the absence of self-nature in beings, etc.). It is also shown how this reading leads to an innovative treatment of the concept of selfhood, viewing the self as the active openness of an existent to the surrounding world, with which it is able to identify through a mutual relation with other existents within the existential moment. This argument is supported by an alternative translation in the “momentary mode” of those extracts of the fascicle that introduce or elaborate on Dōgen’s key concepts.

Continue reading “Philosophy East and West, vol. 62, no. 2 (2012)”

ARTICLES

The Cultivation of Moral Feelings and Mengzi’s Method of Extension
Emily McRae, 587

Offered here is an interpretation of the ancient Confucian philosopher Mengzi’s (372–289 B.C.E.) method of cultivating moral feelings, which he calls “extension.” It is argued that this method is both psychologically plausible and an important, but often overlooked, part of moral life. In this interpretation, extending our moral feelings is not a project in logical consistency, analogical reasoning, or emotional intuition. Rather, Mengzi’s method of extension is a project in realigning the human heart that harnesses our rational, reflective, and emotional capacities in order to extend the feelings we already have to the appropriate objects for these feelings. It is argued that there are three main features of Mengzi’s account that make it an attractive explanation of the cultivation of moral feelings. The first is the way Mengzi sees reasoning and philosophical reflection as an aid to, rather than the foundation for, moral development. The second is Mengzi’s precision regarding the relationship between the basic moral feelings we start with (the “sprouts”) and their corresponding virtues. The method of extension acts as a well-designed bridge between feelings and virtues. Third, Mengzi’s account, unlike that of the Mohist Yi Zhi, whom he criticizes, pays special attention to the complexities and limitations of human psychology. In conclusion it is shown how a Mengzian understanding of the relationship between feelings and morality can answer some traditional challenges, especially Kantian ones, regarding the proper role of emotion in moral life. Continue reading “Philosophy East and West, vol. 61, no. 4 (2011)”