Philosophy East and West, vol. 53, no. 2 (2003)


The Ethical Significance of Shame: Insights of Aristotle and Xunzi
Antonio S. Cua, 147

A constructive interpretation of the Confucian conception of shame is offered here. Xunzi’s discussion is considered the locus classicus of the Confucian conception of shame as contrasted with honor. In order to show his conception as an articulation and development of the more inchoate attitudes of Confucius and Mencius,an excursion is made into the Lunyu and the Mengzi. Aristotle’s conception of shame is used as a sort of catalyst, an opening for appreciating Xunzi’s complementary insights.

How Ibn Sīnian Is Suhrawardī’s Theory of Knowledge?
Mehdi Aminrazavi, 203

It is demonstrated here that despite apparent differences and their adherence to two different schools of thought, Suhrawardī’s epistemology is essentially Ibn Sīnian,and even his theory of ‘‘knowledge by Presence’’ (’ilm al-hudurī), which is considered to be uniquely his,is at least inspired by Ibn Sīnā. I argue that Ibn Sīnā’s peripatetic orientation and Suhrawardī’s ishrāqī perspective have both maintained and adhered to the same epistemological framework while the philosophical languages in which their respective epistemologies are discussed are different.

Xunzi’s Systematic Critique of Mencius
Kim-Chong Chong, 215

Some commentators hold that Xunzi’s criticism of Mencius’ thesis that human nature is good depends more on Xunzi’s definition of xing or nature than on substantive argument. Some also claim that Xunzi is committed to accepting Mencius’ thesis. A more precise account of Xunzi’s critique is offered here, based on an elaboration of his distinction in the ‘‘Xing e pian’’ between ke yi (capacity) and neng (ability). Others have noted this distinction, but no one has sufficiently appreciated its role in making Xunzi’s critique more systematic and substantive than it is usually thought to be.

Filiality versus Sociality and Individuality: On Confucianism as ‘‘Consanguinitism’’
Qingping Liu, 234

Confucianism is often valued as a doctrine that highlights both the individual and social dimensions of the ideal person, for it indeed puts special emphasis on such lofty goals as loving all humanity and cultivating the self. Through a close and critical analysis of the texts of the Analects and the Mencius, however,it is attempted to demonstrate that because Confucius and Mencius always take filial piety, or, more generally, consanguineous affection, as not only the foundation but also the supreme principle of human life, the individual and social dimensions are inevitably subordinated to and substantially negated by the filial precisely within the Confucian framework,with the result that Confucianism in essence is neither collectivism nor individualism, but ‘‘consanguinitism.’’

Renegade Emotion: Buddhist Precedents for Returning Rationality to the Heart
Peter D. Hershock, 251

By drawing out the critical implications of a Buddhist understanding of persons and emotions, it is suggested here that we see emotions as relational transformations through which the direction and qualitative intensities of our interdependence are situationally negotiated, enhanced, and revised. Historical and critical precedents are then offered for reassessing the association of reasoning with the practices of definition and argument, and the consequent association of the operational structure of rationality with that of reality. Reason is better seen as an emotion that has long been renegade and that—especially as institutionalized in the form of global, control-biased technological development—can remain so only at considerable social, cultural, and spiritual risk.

Emotion in Pre-Qin Ruist Moral Theory: An Explanation of ‘‘Dao Begins in Qing’’
Tang Yijie, translated by Brian Bruya and Hai-ming Wen, 271

There is a view that Ruists never put much emphasis on qing and even saw it in a negative light. This is perhaps a misunderstanding,especially in regard to pre-Qin Ruism. In the Guodian Xing zi ming chu, the passage ‘‘dao begins in qing’’ (dao shi yu qing) plays an important role in our understanding of the pre-Qin notion of qing. This article concentrates on the ‘‘theory of qing’’ in both pre-Qin Ruism and Daoism and attempts a philosophical interpretation of ‘‘dao begins in qing,’’ and in the process offers philosophical interpretations of a number of important notions.


Classical Indian Philosophy, by J. N. Mohanty
Reviewed by Vasanthi Srinivasan, 282

Inventing China through History: The May Fourth Approach to Historiography, by Q. Edward Wang
Reviewed by Caroline Reeves, 286