REMEMBERING DAYA KRISHNA (1924–2007)
Knowledge as a Way of Living: In Dialogue with Daya Krishna
Daniel Raveh, 431
Daya Krishna: A Philosopher and Much More
Shail Mayaram, 439
A Memorial Tribute to Daya Krishna
Eliot Deutsch, 445
Candrakīrti on the Theories of Persons of the Sāṃmitīyas and Āryasāṃmitīyas
James Duerlinger, 446
Here it is argued, with the help of Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of Candrakīrti’s theory of persons, and on the basis of the character of Vasubandhu’s encounter with the Pudgalavādins in the “Refutation of the Theory of Self,” that in his Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya Candrakīrti most likely identifies the theory of persons he attributes to the Sāṃmitīyas with the theory of persons Vasubandhu presents in the “Refutation,” and the theory of persons he attributes to the Āryasāṃmitiyas with the Pudgalavādins’ theory of persons, to which Vasubandhu objects in that same work. He interprets Vasubandhu’s thesis, that persons exist as their aggregates, as the thesis of the Sāṃmitīyas, that persons possess the essence of the aggregates, and interprets the Pudgalavādins’ thesis, that persons exist apart from their aggregates as their identity-free substratum, as the thesis of the Āryasāmmitiyas, that persons possess an essence of something that is neither other than nor the same as the aggregates. It is explained that Candrakīrti’s interpretations both rest on the assumption that existence is the possession of an essence and mirror the assumptions upon which Vasubandhu and the Pudgalavādins object to one another’s thesis.
The Purloined Philosopher: Youzi on Learning by Virtue
William A. Haines, 470
This essay is the first general study of the work of You Ruo or Youzi (fl. 470 B.C.E.). It also defends his views and argues that he was an important independent figure in the origins of Confucianism. Youzi is thought to have been a disciple of Confucius, and his work is studied mainly for its insight into Confucius. Hence, his work is seriously misunderstood. In fact Youzi’s main views were not shared by Confucius, and the evidence suggests that Youzi did not study with Confucius. Youzi’s surviving writings form a tightly coherent whole in style and substance. Together they sketch a powerful general vision of the psychology of the virtues and use it to generate parallel solutions to four basic moral dilemmas. Youzi’s thought is highly plausible and directly relevant to current issues in moral theory and practice.
The Postulate of Immortality in Kant: To What Extent Is It Culturally Conditioned?
Edward A. Beach, 492
Kant’s noncognitive argument based on practical reason claims that moral considerations alone suffice to justify the idea of personal immortality as a postulate. Some recent objections are considered here that have charged him with overstepping his own distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. After examining the arguments, Kant is exonerated of having violated his own principles. More troubling, however, is the peculiarity involved in postulating an infinite progression toward a goal whose attainment, by hypothesis, would undermine the very foundations of morality (which for Kant always requires the agonistic condition of struggling to improve one’s lower nature). It is argued that this paradox necessitates a reexamination of some tacit cultural presuppositions underlying Kant’s conception of the soul. Finally, an examination is made of the thought of Kitarō Nishida, whose Zen Buddhist–inspired dialectic of the basho (logical “place”) provides an alternative perspective from which to reconsider the postulate of immortality. Nishida, like Kant, rigorously maintains the phenomenon-noumenon distinction, yet his examination of ethics leads him to postulate an eventual sublation of the “soul” principle. It is concluded that Kant’s postulate of immortality, while plausible enough on its own terms, is limited by a Western cultural bias and therefore fails in the end to be compelling.
Deconstructing Deconstruction: Zhuang Zi as Butterfly, Nietzsche as Gadfly
Sandra A. Wawrytko, 524
Deconstruction and destruction tend to be viewed as a continuum, on the assumption that to deconstruct is to destroy. Deconstruction certainly seems intent on the death of definitive meaning, absolute truth, theoretical flights, and universal values. Versions of the deconstructive task have been addressed and applied by philosophers throughout history and across cultures. By examining such approaches we may learn whether deconstruction must bring destruction in its wake, or whether another outcome might be possible. To test this hypothesis the philosophy of Zhuang Zi is compared with that of Friedrich Nietzsche. Their unique approaches to the deconstructive task point to a deeper issue of contrasting cultural assumptions and grounding principles, allowing a better understanding of what lies at the heart of the philosophical divide between “East” and “West.” Each embraces a strategy of fruitful opposition: gadfly Nietzsche approaches his predecessors with wariness and righteous wrath; butterfly Zhuang Zi co-opts Kong Zi, and confounds Hui Zi. The distinction between opponent and competitor parallels that between wu-wei effortlessness and wei aggression. Despite an intuitive grasp of the child’s ‘yes’ to life, wu-wei, Nietzsche remains mired in a defective wei strategy, while Zhuang Zi’s Daoist deconstruction takes the form of wu-wei philosophical play.
This essay examines the intra-poetic relationship between the “Inner Chapters” and the “Syncretist Chapters” of the Zhuangzi, exploring the affinities and tensions between the two competing works by analyzing not only how the Syncretist authors deliberately displace and recast the precursor poem by engaging in an act of creative revisionism, but also how the “Syncretist Chapters” unconsciously reveal a hidden debt to the “Inner Chapters,” especially in regard to the practices of inner cultivation and a cosmology of the Dao. As will be argued, the sociopolitical dimensions of syncretic Daoist thought, most pointedly in regard to the art of rulership, seem to be premised on the kind of inner cultivation that we find in the “Inner Chapters.” Indeed, for the Syncretist it is precisely the sovereign’s ability to be “inwardly a sage, outwardly a king” (nei shang wai wang), to coordinate the cosmological and the political, that permits her to “adjust and attune the empire and be in harmony with men.” The “Syncretist Chapters” can thus be viewed as a corrective movement within the history of early Daoism that, in an act of creative revisionism, completes and reconstitutes the “tradition of the Way.”
COMMENT AND DISCUSSION
Accounting for Evil—Justification or Explanation? A Response to Eliot Deutsch
Gwen Griffith-Dickson, 579
In Search of Affinities: Knowledge and Action in Indian Thought, a review of Indian Philosophy and the Consequences of Knowledge: Themes in Ethics, Metaphysics and Soteriology, by Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad
Douglas L. Berger, 585
Buddhisms and Deconstructions, edited by Jin Y. Park
Reviewed by Steven Heine, 596
The Gleam of Light: Moral Perfectionism and Education in Dewey and Emerson, by Naoko Saito
Reviewed by Steve Odin, 598
Bashō and the Dao: The Zhuangzi and the Transformation of Haikai, by Peipei Qiu
Reviewed by W. Puck Brecher, 607
Foundations of Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy, by John D. Dunne
Reviewed by James Duerlinger , 610
BOOKS RECEIVED, 617