Charles Goodman, 377
Scholars have proposed several different interpretations of the doctrine of no-self found in the Buddhist Abhidharma literature. It is argued here that two of these, Constitutive Reductionism and Eliminativism, are ruled out by textual evidence. A third, the Eliminative Reductionism of Siderits, is much closer to the intent of the texts. We can refine it further by attending to the role of metaphor in Vaibhāsika accounts of the no-self doctrine. If we update this view by drawing on analytic philosophy, the result is a variety of metaphoricalism that portrays statements about composite, persisting objects as literally false but practically useful and approximately true. This theory could be relevant to contemporary discussions of reductionism in personal identity.
Here a moral principle called the “Copper Rule” is developed and defended as an alternative to the Golden Rule. Section 1 focuses on two problems with the Golden Rule’s traditional formulation of “Do (or don’t do) unto others what you would (or would not) have them do unto you”: it assumes (1) the uniformity of human needs and preferences and (2) that whatever is universally desired is good. Section 2 examines three attempts to reformulate the Golden Rule—Marcus Singer’s general interpretation, Allan Gewirth’s rationalization, and R. M. Hare’s imaginative role reversal—to show why they all fail to save the Golden Rule from difficulty. In section 3 the rich resources of the Chinese Confucian-Daoist philosophical traditions are appropriated to develop a “Copper Rule” as an alternative moral principle: “Do (or don’t do) unto others as they would (or would not) have us do unto them.” This moral principle not only avoids the two problems, but also has additional advantages. In section 4 the “Copper Rule” is defended against three objections or counterarguments: what if people ask you (for example) (1) to kill someone else, (2) to kill them, or (3) to kill yourself? The appropriate response is merely to trace the implications of the “Copper Rule” rather than add any ad hoc arguments.
Scholars have underestimated and misunderstood the distinction between Sōtō and Rinzai, the two major branches of Zen Buddhism, because they have either parroted the sectarian polemics of the schools themselves or, as in the case of prominent scholars Carl Bielefeldt and T. P. Kasulis, dismissed these polemics as deriving from institutional politics rather than substantive doctrinal or practical differences. Here it is attempted for the first time to understand the polemics of these two schools as reflecting a real disparity in concept and practice. The psychological concept of manas of the Yogācāra or “mind-only” school, a Buddhist philosophical tradition that is foundational to Mahāyāna Buddhist meditation practice and to Zen, is investigated. This concept is used to explicate the mental mechanics of meditation in order to appreciate the criticisms of classical Zen Masters directed against each other and thereby to understand important conceptual and practical differences between the two schools.
The Problematic of Continuity: Nishida Kitarō and Aristotle
Tao Jiang, 447
This essay is an attempt to explain Nishida’s logic of the predicate in its challenge to the Aristotelian object logic that is the foundation of substance metaphysics. It offers a comparative analysis of the critical issue of continuity so as to show why Nishida thinks Aristotelian logic cannot deal with the problematic of continuity of change while his own logic of the predicate can. It further explores the significance of Nishida’s logic in providing the foundation for a non-substance ontology of dynamic reality.
Some well-known translations of the words attributed to the Master in Analects 6.25, “gu bu gu gu zai gu zai,” are analyzed and sorted out. It is argued that this passage can be given a consistent reading and an interpretation that coheres with a major theme of the text, namely that the ontological status of a thing, like that of a person, is relative to the practice of constitutive rules and conventions.
Ritual and Reverence in Ancient China and Today, a review of Reverence: Renewing a Forgotten Virtue, by Paul Woodruff
Stephen C. Angle, 471
A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy, Part Two, by Hajime Nakamura, translated by Hajime Nakamura, Trevor Leggett, and others, and edited by Sengaku Mayeda
Reviewed by Andrew O. Fort, 480
Indian Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction, by Sue Hamilton
Reviewed by Heeraman Tiwari, 482
In Praise of Blandness: Proceeding from Chinese Thought and Aesthetics, by François Jullien, translated by Paul M. Varsano
Reviewed by Joseph Grange, 484
Buddhism and Deconstruction: Toward a Comparative Semiotics, by Youxuan Wang
Reviewed by Youru Wang, 486
On the Epistemology of the Senses in Early Chinese Thought, by Jane Geaney
Reviewed by Xinyan Jiang, 489
Mystical Consciousness: Western Perspectives and Dialogue with Japanese Thinkers, by Louis Roy, O.P.
Reviewed by Pamela D. Winfield, 493
Images of Women in Chinese Thought and Culture: Writings from the Pre-Qin Period through the Song Dynasty, edited by Robin R. Wang
Reviewed by Xiufen Lu, 496
Different Paths, Different Summits: A Model for Religious Pluralism, by Stephen Kaplan