Guest Editor: Koji Tanaka
Introduction: Buddhism and Contradiction
Koji Tanaka, 315
Contradictions in Dōgen
Koji Tanaka, 322
Continue reading “Philosophy East and West, vol. 63, no. 3 (2013): Buddhism and Contradiction”
The “Mandate of Heaven”: Mencius and the Divine Command Theory of Political Legitimacy
A. T. Nuyen, 113
Commentators have recently turned their attention to the Confucian notion of the mandate of heaven. The question is: Is the ruler legitimate because Heaven says so, or does Heaven say so because he is qualified as a legitimate ruler (i.e., by the way he benefits the people)? The answer depends on how the notion of mandate of heaven is interpreted. In what might be called the liberal interpretation, the mandate of heaven lies in the will of the people. In what might be called the conservative reading, the mandate to rule lies in a heaven that transcends the people. To subscribe to the latter is to subscribe to what might be called the “Divine Command Theory of political legitimacy,” analogous to the Divine Command Theory of morality. By contrast, the liberal reading of “mandate of heaven” is analogous to the “moral autonomy” position. Mencius’ view on political legitimacy will be discussed in terms of the Divine Command Theory so as to permit a comparison with Kant’s account of moral judgments. It will be argued that Kant manages to avoid being impaled on either horn of the Euthyphro dilemma by grasping both horns. In the same way, Mencius’ view can be read as one that incorporates both the liberal and the conservative positions. It will be argued that such reading is more consistent with textual evidence and renders Mencius’ position more coherent.
Continue reading “Philosophy East and West, vol. 63, no. 2 (2013)”
Guest Editor Introduction: Determinism, Responsibility, and Asian Philosophy
Mark Siderits, 1
Moral Luck, Self-Cultivation, and Responsibility: The Confucian Conception of Free Will and Determinism
Kyung-Sig Hwang, 4
In this essay it is argued that the conception of free will and determinism implied by Confucianism (of Confucius and Mencius) takes a compatibilist form. On one hand, it is argued that it is difficult to see libertarian free will in Confucianism. Confucianism’s virtue ethics, with its emphasis on human character formation, cannot avoid the influence of internal factors and external circumstances on one’s character that are beyond one’s control. On the other hand, Confucianism espouses voluntary character formation and self-cultivation through human choice. This attitude likewise renders a hard determinist view untenable. With hard determinism and absolute free will both difficult to accept, the Confucian ethicists, beginning with Confucius and Mencius, seem to have been unable to avoid swinging between two extremes. However, as ethicists who exhort voluntary moral effort, they place autonomous action in the forefront of their compatibilism over inborn luck or fated events. Although this compatibilism may be valid from the standpoint of a practical philosophy that supports existing moral practices and responsibility, I examine whether it is truly tenable from a theoretical perspective.
Continue reading “Philosophy East and West, vol. 63, no. 1 (2013)”
Hōnen and James on Religious Transformation: Psychological Conditions of Conversion and the Nembutsu
Yumiko Inukai, 439
Hōnen, the founder of the Jōdo School of Buddhism in Japan, came to a strong conviction of the efficacy of the nembutsu through his deep personal experience, in which he realized that he would be incapable of mastering the Buddhist teachings and practices. Although Hōnen refrains from urging the nembutsu practitioner to focus on the mental components of the nembutsu, a close reading of his texts reveals that he has a systematic view of a psychological process that the nembutsu practitioner must go through in order to recite the nembutsu properly. I argue that Hōnen’s account of a deep, dynamic psychological structure of the nembutsu practitioner exhibits a strong parallel to psychological factors in the preconditions of religious experience elucidated by James in his Varieties of Religious Experience. Moreover, interestingly, Hōnen’s religious conviction of the Jōdo belief being grounded in his own emotionally infused personal experience accords well with James’ contention regarding religion in general. James’ psychological analyses of religious experience provide an illuminating framework in which we can understand the significance of the psychological process of the nembutsu practitioner expounded by Hōnen in his teachings of the nembutsu as well as the importance of Hōnen’s own personal experience.
Continue reading “Philosophy East and West, vol. 62, no. 4 (2012)”
Nishida Kitarō, G.W.F. Hegel, and the Pursuit of the Concrete: A Dialectic of Dialectics
Lucy Schultz, 319
A comparison of the dialectical worldviews of Nishida and Hegel is made by developing the notion of dialectical ontology as concrete philosophy in which logic is understood to extend beyond the level of discourse to the point where knowledge and experience cease to be opposed. The differences between their dialectical methods are outlined, highlighting Hegel’s emphasis on the actualization of self-consciousness and historical progress in contrast to Nishida’s concepts of the dialectal universal “place,” the external now, and the self as expressive monad. It is argued that neither thinker is able to fulfill his own demand for a maximally concrete philosophy. However, by performing a dialectic of their dialectics, the pursuit of concrete philosophy is furthered. Takahashi Satomi’s notion of “inclusive dialectics” is introduced to aid in articulating the comparative standpoint through which such a dialectic may be conceived.
Continue reading “Philosophy East and West, vol. 62, no. 3 (2012)”
The Existential Moment: Rereading Dōgen’s Theory of Time
Rein Raud, 153
This article argues for a new way to interpret Dōgen’s theory of time, reading the notion of uji as momentary existence, and shows that many notorious difficulties usually associated with the theory can be overcome with this approach, which is also more compatible with some fundamental assumptions of Buddhist philosophy (the non-durational existence of dharmas, the arbitrariness of linguistic designations and the concepts they point to, the absence of self-nature in beings, etc.). It is also shown how this reading leads to an innovative treatment of the concept of selfhood, viewing the self as the active openness of an existent to the surrounding world, with which it is able to identify through a mutual relation with other existents within the existential moment. This argument is supported by an alternative translation in the “momentary mode” of those extracts of the fascicle that introduce or elaborate on Dōgen’s key concepts.
Continue reading “Philosophy East and West, vol. 62, no. 2 (2012)”
Parasitism and Disjunctivism in Nyāya Epistemology
Matthew R. Dasti, 1
This article examines a number of arguments I collectively term arguments from parasitism, which Nyāya employs to illustrate that rational reflection, the institution of language, and even error itself presuppose a ground-level basis of veridical cognitive interaction with the world. It further suggests that by such arguments, coupled with its stress on the inerrancy of pramāṇas, Nyāya anticipates and supports the contemporary philosophical movement known as (epistemological) disjunctivism.
Continue reading “Philosophy East and West, vol. 62, no. 1 (2012)”
The Cultivation of Moral Feelings and Mengzi’s Method of Extension
Emily McRae, 587
Offered here is an interpretation of the ancient Confucian philosopher Mengzi’s (372–289 B.C.E.) method of cultivating moral feelings, which he calls “extension.” It is argued that this method is both psychologically plausible and an important, but often overlooked, part of moral life. In this interpretation, extending our moral feelings is not a project in logical consistency, analogical reasoning, or emotional intuition. Rather, Mengzi’s method of extension is a project in realigning the human heart that harnesses our rational, reflective, and emotional capacities in order to extend the feelings we already have to the appropriate objects for these feelings. It is argued that there are three main features of Mengzi’s account that make it an attractive explanation of the cultivation of moral feelings. The first is the way Mengzi sees reasoning and philosophical reflection as an aid to, rather than the foundation for, moral development. The second is Mengzi’s precision regarding the relationship between the basic moral feelings we start with (the “sprouts”) and their corresponding virtues. The method of extension acts as a well-designed bridge between feelings and virtues. Third, Mengzi’s account, unlike that of the Mohist Yi Zhi, whom he criticizes, pays special attention to the complexities and limitations of human psychology. In conclusion it is shown how a Mengzian understanding of the relationship between feelings and morality can answer some traditional challenges, especially Kantian ones, regarding the proper role of emotion in moral life. Continue reading “Philosophy East and West, vol. 61, no. 4 (2011)”
Dr. Kenneth K. Inada (1923–2011), 407
A Memorial Tribute to Kenneth K. Inada
Eliot Deutsch, 408
Abstract Concept Formation in Archaic Chinese Script Forms: Some Humboldtian Perspectives
Tze-wan Kwan, 409
Starting from the Humboldtian characterization of Chinese writing as a “script of thoughts,” this article makes an attempt to show that notwithstanding the important role played by phonetic elements, the Chinese script also relies on visual-graphical means in its constitution of meaning. In point of structure, Chinese characters are made up predominantly of components that are sensible or even tangible in nature. Out of these sensible components, not only physical objects or empirical states of affairs can be expressed, but also the most subtle and abstract concepts, such as 萬, 它, 言, 災, 仁, 義, 思, 念, 法, 律, 善, 考, 莫, 睘, and 幾, attesting to what Humboldt says about the Chinese script as having “embraced philosophical work within itself.” Humboldt’s idea of “analogy of script” throws light on the mechanism behind this structure to stimulate new reflections on the traditional theory of the “Six Ways” (六書) of character formation to provide a productive platform for interpretation.
Continue reading “Philosophy East and West, vol. 61, no. 3 (2011)”
The Différance that Makes All the Difference: A Comparison of Derrida and Śankara
Carl Olson, 247
This essay compares Śankara and Jacques Derrida on the issue of difference. This hermeneutical dialogue compares the two thinkers with respect to the following items: différance and nonduality; presence and trace; being and alterity; and truth, meaning, and reality. This essay intends to compare Śankara and Derrida on what the latter calls différance because it is a central notion in his postmodern philosophy, whereas nondualism is stressed by the former philosopher. Therefore, this comparison engages two philosophies that move in completely different directions. Continue reading “Philosophy East and West, vol. 61, no. 2 (2011)”
Embodiment, Subjectivity, and Disembodied Existence
Ramesh Kumar Sharma, 1
This essay starts with a clarification of the assumption that prima facie all experience is lived embodied experience. Continue reading “Philosophy East and West, vol. 61, no. 1 (2011)”
Cartesian Intuitions, Humean Puzzles, and the Buddhist Conception of the Self
Alan Tomhave, 443
The Cartesian conception of the self is of an essentially thinking thing, a robust “I,” one that wills, feels, et cetera. This Cartesian self is often taken as opposed to the Buddhist conception of the self, which includes the doctrine of anatta, or “no soul.” Continue reading “Philosophy East and West, vol. 60, no. 4 (2010)”
